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Ex Parte Quirin: The Nazi Saboteur Case
and the Tribunal Precedent
Andrew Buttaro*
I. Introduction
Late on a moonless night in June 1942, the metal hull of a German submarine scraped the
sandy bottom of the Long Island coast.1 The captain, realizing he could proceed no farther, pivoted
the vessel parallel to shore to allow for rapid escape in the event of detection.2 A team of four Nazi
commandoes emerged from the hatch, and two sailors inflated a rubber boat to ferry them ashore.3
The crew pushed off, trailing a line to guide the sailors’ return after the landing.4 The raft, heavily
laden with explosives and gear, found the beach through a thick fog and the four saboteurs scurried
ashore.5 The commandoes were instructed to change into civilian dress after disembarkation and
bury evidence of their arrival.6 Their mission—for which they had undergone weeks of specialized
training in Germany—was to surreptitiously enter the United States and destroy industrial targets
deemed valuable to the American war effort.7
Things went awry from the first step on American soil. A Coast Guard officer patrolling the
Amagansett beach noticed the group’s frenzied activity in the minutes after landing and approached
them to investigate.8 The commandoes had been trained to overpower anyone offering resistance,
but the group’s leader—perhaps in a moment of panic—hastily shoved 260 American dollars into
the Guardsman’s hands in the hopes of buying his silence. More ominously, he added that it would
be best for him to look the other way.9 The bewildered Guardsman returned to his post to report the
Andrew Buttaro is an associate at Locke Lord LLP in Dallas, Texas. He previously served as a law clerk for the Supreme
Court of Texas and a member of the legal team of a presidential campaign. He received his law degree and a master’s in
legal history from the University of Virginia in 2012.
1
Michael Dobbs, Saboteurs: The Nazi Raid on America 82 (2004); Gary Cohen, The Keystone Kommandos, The
Atlantic, (Feb. 2002), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2002/02/the-keystone-kommandos/302405/ (“As
the vessel approached the Long Island coast, on June 12, the captain switched from diesel to silent electric motors. Just
before midnight the men heard a scraping sound: the sub had touched the ocean floor some fifty yards from shore.”).
2
Louis Fisher, Nazi Saboteurs on Trial 25–26 (2003).
3
Id. at 26; see also Aileen Jacobson, Nazi Saboteurs in the Amagansett Sands, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2014 (“The four
saboteurs rowed ashore in a rubber dinghy filled with explosives, clothing, cash and a plan to blow up aluminum and
magnesium plants, canals, bridges and other structures over the coming two years.”).
4
Eugene Rachlis, They Came To Kill 4–5 (1961).
5
Id. at 6.
6
Id. at 103; Fisher, supra note 2, at 26.
7
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 20–21; see also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 15–34 (detailing the training regimen).
8
Cohen, supra note 1 (“Also on the beach that night, on a six-mile foot patrol, was Coast Guardsman John Cullen, of
Bayside, Queens, a twenty-one-year-old former Macy’s deliveryman who enlisted in the Coast Guard in 1940 and later
became a ‘sand pounder,’ to keep watch at night for suspicious activity close to shore. For weeks on end Cullen had
patrolled, unarmed, without ever encountering another person. But at about 12:30 that morning, through the fog, he
saw a dark object in the water some twenty feet away, and three men standing nearby.”).
9
Andy Newman, Terrorists Among Us (1942); Detecting the Enemy Wasn’t Easy Then, Either, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2002
*
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unusual encounter, and the Nazi saboteurs escaped to a rail station and hurriedly boarded a train to
Manhattan.10
Despite evading capture on the beach, the sabotage mission never really got underway.
Shortly after arriving in the United States, the group’s leader voluntarily approached the Washington
headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and confessed to the entire plot.11 Most
damagingly, he revealed that a second team of saboteurs had been dispatched to Florida.12 Within
days, the government apprehended the Florida group.13 Within weeks, the administration of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and congressional leaders decided to try the putative saboteurs
outside of the civil justice system, electing instead on prosecution by military tribunal.14 Within
months, six of the saboteurs were executed and the remaining two were sentenced to lengthy prison
sentences.15
Counsel for the saboteurs challenged the use of the military tribunal from the start, and
the Supreme Court was asked to determine its constitutionality. In a unanimous opinion, the
justices upheld the government’s course of action.16 Given the need for an expedited decision, the
Court initially released only a brief per curiam writing, but months later—after the saboteurs were
executed—it issued a significantly more expansive opinion.17 In Ex parte Quirin, as the litigation
is known, the Court provided the legal justification for its original ruling.18 While of interest to
specialist legal scholars, the opinion attracted relatively little popular and press attention; and given
that the executions had effectively decided the issue, it had little practical significance.19 For the
subsequent several decades Quirin largely faded from view, cropping up only in the occasional

(“Dasch balked, threatened him and gave him $260 to get lost.”); Dobbs, supra note 1, at 82, 104 (recalling the orders to
overpower any opposition).
10
Fisher, supra note 2, at 29 (chronicling the Guardsman’s actions after the beach encounter); see also Cohen, supra note
1 (“Eventually, at just after five in the morning, they stumbled into the tiny train station in Amagansett . . . When the
station opened for business, at six-thirty, Dasch bought four tickets to Manhattan.”); Dobbs, supra note 1, at 104–05
(discussing the train).
11
Cohen, supra note 1 (“On Sunday, June 14, Dasch called the FBI.”).
12
Fisher, supra note 2, at 40–41.
13
Fisher, supra note 2, at 42.
14
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 204.
15
Lewis Wood, Clemency for Two, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1942 (“Six of the eight Nazi saboteurs were executed in the
electric chair at the District of Columbia Jail [Aug. 8], while the two others were sentenced to serve at hard labor for life
and for thirty years, respectively. The executions started at noon.”).
16
The per curiam opinion is reproduced within Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942).
17
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 269.
18
See generally 317 U.S. 1 (1942). The case is named for Richard Quirin, one of the saboteurs. Quirin was born in
Germany in 1908 and moved to the United States in 1927. He worked in maintenance at a General Electric plant in
Schenectady, New York, but was laid off during the Depression. He then moved to New York City, where he joined the
Friends of the New Germany and found work as a housepainter. Prior to the mission, he returned to Germany as part of
a government repatriation program. See Cohen, supra note 1.
19
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 269; Cass R. Sunstein & Jack L. Goldsmith, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 Const. Comment. 261 (2002) (“The announcement of the Court’s opinion in Quirin
was reported with little fanfare.”).
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law review article or as a footnote in histories of the Second World War.20 And there it may have
languished, but for the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.21
Two months after the attacks, President George W. Bush issued a military order to govern
the detention, treatment, and trial of terrorists.22 The Bush pronouncement was closely modeled on
Roosevelt’s earlier order, which outlined the framework ultimately upheld in Quirin.23 While there
is ample discussion in both academic and lay literature of the Bush administration’s anti-terror legal
structure, the history and context of the Quirin decision is often given only cursory mention in these
writings.24 This article seeks to rectify this situation by synthesizing scholarly and general studies of
the Nazi saboteur case, and underscoring Quirin’s importance to the legal framework undergirding
the War on Terror. This effort begins by briefly tracing the background history of the Nazi plan
to infiltrate the United States and weaken its war machine from the inside. Second, substantial
attention is paid to the political and legal decisions that led to the creation of the 1942 military
Fisher, supra note 2, at 134–38 (providing a useful overview of the relatively few mentions of the case in subsequent
legal literature); see also Carl Tobias, Book Review, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 365 (2006) (“Quirin languished as a
wartime artifact until November 2001, when President George W. Bush invoked the ruling to create military tribunals,
as well as to purportedly abrogate federal court jurisdiction and deny federal court access to those prosecuted or held for
suspected terrorist behavior.”); see also Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, The New Yorker (July 3, 2006), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2006/07/03/the-hidden-power (referring to Ex parte Quirin as an “arcane 1942 case”).
20

John Yoo, Opinion, How the Presidency Regained Its Balance, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2006), http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/09/17/opinion/17yoo.html?ei=50&_r=0 (“Five years after 9/11, President Bush has taken
his counterterrorism case to the American people. Thus the administration has . . . formed military tribunals
modeled on those of past wars, as when we tried and executed a group of Nazi saboteurs found in the United
States.”).
21

Exec. Order No. 57833, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 (Nov. 16, 2001) (“To protect the United States and its citizens, and for
the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is necessary for individuals subject to
this order pursuant to section 2 hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the laws of war and
other applicable laws by military tribunals.”). A military order invokes the president’s power as commander-in-chief,
while an executive order is predicated on a president’s power as the chief executive officer of the United States. See Anne
English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush Military Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms? 63 Ohio St. L. J. 1225,
1226–27 n.4 (2002).
23
See George Lardner, Jr., Nazi Saboteurs Captured! FDR Orders Secret Tribunal, Wash. Post Mag. (Jan. 13, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/magazine/2002/01/13/nazi-saboteurs-captured-fdr-orders-secrettribunal/f47e7bee-4b40-4079-8a50-aebb5ea89e43/ (calling Quirin “the case that President Bush relied on most
heavily for his November 13 order empowering him to create military tribunals for accused foreign terrorists and their
collaborators”); see also Alberto R. Gonzales, Opinion, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. Times (Nov. 30, 2001), http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/11/30/opinion/martial-justice-full-and-fair.html (“Like presidents before him, President Bush
has invoked his power to establish military commissions to try enemy belligerents who commit war crimes. . . . Nazi
saboteurs who came ashore on Long Island during World War II disguised as civilians and intending to attack American
war industries were tried before military commissions. The use of such commissions has been consistently upheld by the
Supreme Court.”); see also Mayer, supra note 20 (quoting former White House counsel Bradford Berenson: “The legal
foundation was very strong. F.D.R.’s order establishing military commissions had been upheld by the Supreme Court.
This was almost identical.”).
24
See Sunstein & Goldsmith, supra note 19, at 261 (noting that Bush’s “Military Order was greeted with impassioned
criticism in the press, the legal academy, and Congress”); see, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion, Citizens, Combatants and
the Constitution, N.Y. Times (June 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/16/opinion/16TRIB.html (referencing
an ongoing “debate” over the treatment of terrorist suspects, and mentioning the saboteur case in passing).
22
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tribunal. Third, the Court’s opinion in Quirin is closely scrutinized, with issues of present relevance
commanding particular attention. Finally, the article concludes with an evaluation of the relationship
between Quirin and the tribunal structure in place today. The overarching hope of this writing is that
by better understanding the original framework of the military tribunal, the contemporary debate
regarding the appropriateness of trying terrorist suspects in military courts will be clarified.
II. Background History
A. The Roots and Execution of Operation Pastorius
Nazi plans to engage in anti-American sabotage predated hostilities between Germany and
the United States.25 Several years before the invasion of Poland, the German government sponsored
a school for covert operations in Brandenberg, a city about thirty-five miles west of Berlin.26 The
decision to target the United States emerged in the wake of a botched intelligence operation that
proved deeply embarrassing to the German high command.27 William Sebold, a German native, had
worked in various American industries throughout the 1920s and 1930s.28 Noting his familiarity
with American business and social customs, the Nazi government attempted, in 1939, to recruit
him for espionage operations.29 Sebold readily agreed.30 Unfortunately for the Nazi government,
Sebold also informed the American consulate that he had been pressured to serve as a spy, and the
FBI groomed him to operate as a double agent.31 As a result of his counter-espionage, in 1941,
thirty-three Nazi spies were arrested and tried in what became known as the “Sebold Affair.”32
Infuriated by this humiliating decapitation of his American intelligence operations, Adolf Hitler
demanded that sabotage operations be launched in response.33 His intelligence chiefs had complied,
of course, although some saw little hope of success; as one confided to a colleague, “the whole thing
is hopeless.”34 Despite the tepid endorsement, the plan—codenamed “Operation Pastorius”—moved
forward.35
Fisher, supra note 2, at 1.
Fisher, supra note 2, at 4; see Robin Havers, The Second World War 9 (2002) (“Hitler’s invasion of Poland was the
event that precipitated the Second World War.”).
27
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 57.
28
Fisher, supra note 2, at 3.
29
Fisher, supra note 2, at 3.
30
See generally Peter Duffy, Double Agent: The First Hero of World War II and How the FBI Outwitted and
Destroyed a Nazi Spy Ring (2014).
31
Id.
25
26

Id. at 5; see also Richard Goldstein, Helluva Town: The Story of New York City During World War
II 38 (2010) (explaining that the plot of the 1945 film The House on 92nd Street was partly inspired by the
Sebold Affair).
32

Fisher, supra note 2, at 4.
Fisher, supra note 2, at 4.
35
Fisher, supra note 2, at 5–6. As Fisher notes, the etymology of this codename is highly ironic. The plan was named
after Franz Daniel Pastorius, an early German settler in the American colonies. He arrived in Philadelphia in 1683 as
the leader of thirteen German families, and was a central figure in the development of the Germantown settlement in
Pennsylvania. Pastorius and his followers were devoted abolitionists and took steps to outlaw slavery in German religious
33
34
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By April 1942, eight men (culled from a larger group) were receiving explosives and weapons
training for planned operations against American railroads, factories, bridges, and other strategic
targets.36 After approximately three weeks of instruction, the men vacationed for the early portion
of May, returning to the camp for only a few final days of education.37 On May 22, the group left
for Paris.38 There, the octet hardly inspired confidence in their Nazi superiors. One of the team,
imbibing heavily, boasted to fellow bar patrons that he was a secret agent, and another caused a
scene when he refused to pay a prostitute for her services.39 The military planners made their share
of mistakes too, as it turned out. The United States currency distributed to the agents was allocated
in series, leaving it vulnerable to detection, and part of their spending allowance was disbursed in
gold certificates; the Roosevelt administration criminalized the possession of monetary gold in 1933,
however, and using such obsolete currency risked unwelcome attention from American officials.40
After the stayover in Paris, the group left for the coastal town of Lorient, where it boarded
the submarines that would take them to the United States.41 In Lorient, the saboteurs separated
into two units: the first, led by George Dasch, was intended for Long Island; and the second, led by
Edward Kerling, was destined for Florida.42 Dasch’s group was the first to reach the United States,
clumsily landing in Amagansett late on June 12 (as described in the Introduction). Although Dasch’s
group avoided immediate capture, the Coast Guard located evidence from the bumbled landing,
including buried explosives, and transferred it to the FBI.43 The second submarine reached Ponte
Vedra, a town near Jacksonville, Florida, on the night of June 16.44 The Kerling group’s arrival was
the antithesis of the Long Island debacle. No resistance was encountered, and the Germans were at
one point contentedly “swimming and relaxing like vacationers.”45 One even collected American
sand in a jar to keep as a memento.46 The Kerling group buried its incriminating materials and
dispersed as planned.47 But despite the smoother arrival, Kerling’s group was doomed by Dasch, who
turned himself in to an initially incredulous FBI before the saboteurs could cause any mayhem.48 By
June 27, the entire group had been arrested and evidence of the Florida landing recovered.49
communities. Thus, it is incongruous (to say the least) that he lent his name to a plan designed to win a war for a racially
supremacist government. See also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 53.
36
Fisher, supra note 2, at 6; Dobbs, supra note 1, at 17.
37
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 15–34 (detailing the training regimen).
38
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 87–88.
39
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 88–89.
40
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 91.
41
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 89.
42
Fisher, supra note 2, at 19.
43
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 113.
44
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 129; see also Cohen, supra note 1 (“Rounding up the second team, which had landed near
Jacksonville, Florida, during the night of June 16, was somewhat more difficult.”).
45
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 129–30.
46
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 129–30.
47
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 129.
48
Cohen, supra note 1 (“On the morning of June 18 Dasch packed for Washington. . . . Dasch spoke with FBI special
agents over the next five days”); see also Joseph T. McCann, Terrorism on American Soil 82 (2006).
49
Fisher, supra note 2, at 38.
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B. The Turn Toward Military Tribunals
Originally, the FBI had assumed that the saboteurs would be arraigned in district court and
tried within the civil system.50 Thus, the loquacious Dasch was encouraged to plead guilty before
a magistrate, and the FBI strongly intimated that a presidential pardon would be forthcoming
in exchange for his cooperation.51 At the later military trial, Dasch’s attorney asked one of the
interrogating agents:
Was it stated as a part of that proposal that after his plea of guilty he
should be sentenced and that during the trial he should not divulge
anything with respect to the agreement that was made, and that after
the case had died down and for about, say, three to six months, the FBI
would get a Presidential pardon for him?52
The agent admitted: “That, in substance, is true.”53 With this understanding, Dasch agreed to
plead guilty.54 When Dasch spotted his photo plastered on the front of a newspaper being read by
a jailhouse guard, however, he believed he had been betrayed by the FBI, and withdrew his plea in
order to make a full statement in open court.55 This turn of events was one reason that the Roosevelt
administration elected to try him by secret military trial, as it would deprive the erratic Dasch of a
public audience.56
Other pragmatic considerations strongly recommended in favor of a military tribunal as
well. First, the government believed a guilty verdict in civil court would likely entail incarceration
for only a few years, whereas the military tribunal could administer the death penalty.57 Although
sabotage carried a maximum penalty of thirty years, the government was doubtful it could prevail on
that charge given the suspects’ cooperation (and the fact that the plan was aborted before any actual
sabotage occurred).58 The more attainable—but lesser—charge of conspiracy carried a maximum
Fisher, supra note 2, at 43; see also Richard J. Ellis, The Development of the American Presidency 553–55 (2012)
(“FBI agents originally planned to try the saboteurs in civil court.”).
51
Fisher, supra note 2, at 43; see also Cohen, supra note 1 (“During his interrogation, Dasch later said, the FBI had
told him to plead guilty and not to mention his betrayal—just to put on ‘the biggest act in the world’ and ‘take the
punishment,’ for which, after a few months in prison, he would receive a presidential pardon.”).
50

52

Trial transcript, RG 153, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army),

Court-Martial
53

Case Files, CM 334178, 1942 German Saboteur Case.

Id.

Fisher, supra note 2, at 45–46.
55
Fisher, supra note 2, at 46; Dobbs, supra note 1, at 198 (observing the newspaper featured Dasch’s face and the
headline reading “Captured Nazi Spy”).
56
Fisher, supra note 2, at 46 (stating that some in Congress also recommended a military trial); see also Spy Aides in City
Captured by FBI, N.Y. Times, June 29, 1942 (“Senator O’Mahoney added that in his opinion the case should be subject
to military rather than civil prosecution.”).
57
Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 328 (1962); Fisher, supra note 2, at 46–47.
58
Biddle, supra note 57, at 328. The sabotage statute is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2153 (1994) (“Whoever, when
the United States is at war, or in times of national emergency as declared by the President or by the Congress, with intent
to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war or
defense activities, or, with reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States or any
54
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sentence of only two years.59 Second, the public was under the impression that J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI
had immediately detected and thwarted the plot, and there was tremendous pressure—particularly
from Hoover himself—to keep this narrative alive.60 The administration saw utility in furthering
this version of events as well, because the threat of future incursions would likely be reduced if
the Nazi government believed an omnipotent and omnipresent FBI stymied the saboteur plot in
its infancy.61 Although the New York Times and the Washington Post got wind of the reality of the
landing at Amagansett, Hoover downplayed the reportage, and the press was told that there was “no
Coast Guard side—for publication” available.62 Third, and perhaps most obvious, the United States
was in the midst of a global war, and many were simply more concerned with national security than
procedural safeguards.63 Army Major General George V. Strong of the military intelligence division
summarily indicated as much in a memo to Secretary of War Henry Stimson.64 “The exigencies of
the present situation appear to demand drastic action without too much deference to the technical
rights which might be accorded, under the Constitution,” wrote Strong on June 28, proposing a
military commission.65 Roosevelt was even thought to see symbolic value in trying the saboteurs by
tribunal, as it would underscore the reality that six months after Pearl Harbor, the country was at
war.66
associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war or defense activities, willfully injures, destroys, contaminates or
infects, or attempts to so injure, destroy, contaminate or infect any war material, war premises, or war utilities, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than thirty years, or both.”).
59
See 18 U.S.C. § 88 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371) (reading, in the 1944 historical and revision notes, “This
section consolidates said sections 88 and 294 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed. . . . The punishment provision is completely
rewritten to increase the penalty from 2 years to 5 years”); see also Fisher, supra note 2, at 46–47; Dobbs, supra note 1,
at 200; Biddle, supra note 57, at 328 (expressing the author’s doubts that the government could have prevailed on the
sabotage charge, as “the preparations and landings were not close enough to the planned act of sabotage to constitute
attempt”).
60
Newman, supra note 9 (“Attorney General Francis Biddle wanted the men tried in secret, in part to preserve the
impression—both in America and in Germany—that the F.B.I. director, J. Edgar Hoover, and his men were master
spy-catchers.”); see Lardner, supra note 23 (“Secretary of War Henry Stimson hit the roof, too, but not happily.
Military intelligence had wanted to watch and wait until August when two more teams of saboteurs were expected
to come ashore. Hoover’s grandstanding ruined that plan. ‘I have never seen Stimson so furious,’ recalls Washington
attorney Lloyd N. Cutler, then a junior lawyer on the prosecution team. ‘Hoover grabbed all the glory and made the
announcement without telling Stimson.’”); see also Dobbs, supra note 1, at 196.
61
See Lardner, supra note 23 (“Secrecy was essential . . . lest the Germans realize how porous the U.S. coastline was”).
62
Saboteurs Face Military Justice; Inquiry Widens, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1942.
63
This is hardly a novel occurrence, as the longevity of the ancient maixm Inter arma enim silent leges—“In times of war,
the law falls silent”—indicates. See Black’s Law Dictionary 728 (5th ed. 1979) (“It applies as between the state and its
external enemies; and also in cases of civil disturbance where extrajudicial force may supersede the ordinary process of
law.”); see also, generally, William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 224–25 (1998).
64
Lardner, supra note 23.
65
Lardner, supra note 23.
66
Boris I. Bittker, The World War II German Saboteurs’ Case and Writs of Certiorari Before Judgment by the Court of
Appeals: A Tale of Nunc Pro Tunc Jurisdiction. Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 2315. (“According to gossip in the
corridors of the Justice Department, the White House hoped that the drama of a military trial would help to convince
the public that we were really at war, and to end the civilian complacency that prevailed even in 1942, six months after
the debacle at Pearl Harbor.”).

44

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 6, No. 1

On July 2, less than a week after the men had been arrested, Roosevelt issued Proclamation
2561 (“Denying Certain Enemies Access to the Courts of the United States”) to create a military
tribunal that would try the men.67 In the preface, the order stipulated that the “safety of the United
States demands that all enemies who have entered upon the territory of the United States as part of
an invasion or predatory incursion, or who have entered in order to commit sabotage, espionage, or
other hostile or warlike acts, should be promptly tried in accordance with the law of war.”68 The last
three words were crucial. If the “Articles of War” were cited, then the statutory framework specified
by Congress for courts-martial would govern.69 The “law of war,” however, was a more amorphous
collection of international norms. In its lack of formal definition, it resembled a sort of a global
military common law.
Roosevelt made clear that he was not asserting inherent authority as president in constructing
this tribunal structure, claiming instead that he was acting pursuant to both constitutional and
statutory (i.e., congressional) mandates.70 The order also forbade the men from seeking relief in
any civil court. This legal assertion was backed up by a more bare-knuckled political warning,
as Roosevelt personally warned Attorney General Francis Biddle that he would not “hand [the
saboteurs] over to any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas corpus. Understand?”71
Biddle got the message. A separate executive order, promulgated that same day, appointed seven
high-ranking military officials to serve as the tribunal’s decision makers.72
There were other significant departures from traditional courts-martial as well. Crucially,
the order freed the tribunal from rigorous procedural constraints.73 Although offenses against
both the “law of war and the Articles of War” could be tried, the latter’s procedural safeguards did
not necessarily govern.74 Instead, the commission would “have power to and shall, as occasion
requires, make such rules for the conduct of the proceeding, consistent with the powers of military
commissions under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of the
matters before it.”75 In other words, the tribunal could use the Articles of War procedures when
convenient, and construct rules on the fly when preferable. The order also required only a two-thirds
vote for sentencing (the Articles of War required unanimity) and vested “final reviewing authority”
in Roosevelt himself.76 In designing the forum, Roosevelt’s overriding concerns appeared to be
expediency and executive control.
7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (1942).
Id.
69
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 203–04 (“Courts-martial were subject to the Articles of War, a military code dating back to
1775”).
70
Dobbs, supra note 1, at 203–04.
71
Biddle, supra note 57, at 331; see also Lardner, supra note 23.
72
7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (1942).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.; see also Michael R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of the Nazi Saboteur
Case, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 59, 65 (1980) (“The President also directed that, after the proceedings, the trial record should
be transmitted to him for appropriate action, thus ensuring there would be no appeal except to the mercy of the
Commander-in-Chief.”).
67
68
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C. The Tribunal Proceeding
The trial itself took place in a lecture hall on the fifth floor of the Department of Justice
building.77 The windows were covered with black curtains, and the public and press were excluded.78
On July 7, the day before the proceeding began, the tribunal adopted a perfunctory three-and-ahalf page overview outlining the rules of procedure. The statement banned peremptory challenges,
allowed only one challenge for cause, and reiterated Roosevelt’s proviso that the Articles of War need
not govern the tribunal’s operation.79 Pursuant to Roosevelt’s July 2 military order, Attorney General
Biddle and Judge Advocate General of the Army Myron Cramer were to serve as the prosecution,
and Cassius Dowell and Kenneth Royall, both army colonels, were to serve as defense counsel.80 On
July 7, Colonel Carl Ristine was appointed to represent Dasch, leaving Dowell and Royall to defend
the other seven.81
The commission was challenged before it could even swear itself in.82 Defense counsel Royall,
quickly seizing the initiative, argued that the presidential order creating the tribunal was “invalid
and unconstitutional.”83 Leaning heavily on the landmark precedent of Ex parte Milligan (1866),
he argued that because the civil courts in the District of Columbia were currently in operation, the
tribunal was an extralegal presidential creation.84 As a secondary matter, he contested the tribunal’s
departure from the procedures outlined in the Articles of War. Biddle dismissively responded that
he could not imagine that a tribunal “composed of high officers of the Army, under a commission
signed by the Commander-in-Chief, would listen to argument on the question of its power under
Rachlis, supra note 4, at 182–83; see also Lardner, supra note 23 (“On the fifth floor of Justice, reporters assigned to the
trial would keep watch from the press room where they could speculate in print on the comings and goings of unnamed
witnesses. They weren’t allowed inside.”).
78
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David Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 61, 67 (1996).
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to challenge the authority of the military commission.”).
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Dobbs, supra note 1, at 211, 219. Royall “had the more effective courtroom manner,” but “also had the weaker case.”
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Jonathan Mahler, The Challenge: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and the Fight Over Presidential Power 72 (2010)
(“Royall built his defense of the Nazi saboteurs on the back of Milligan”); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see also
Kermit L. Hall, The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court Decisions, 189–90 (2001). Because of the
centrality of Milligan to the saboteur case, it is worth briefly recounting its factual background and holding. In late 1864,
the Union Army arrested Lambdin P. Milligan and other vocal antiwar Democrats, charging them with conspiracy to
raid federal arsenals and prisoner-of-war camps. Doubtful that an Indiana jury would be willing to convict, army officials
elected to try the prisoners by military commission. Milligan challenged his capital sentence, and the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the military court lacked jurisdiction and therefore the prisoners should be released. Despite
the consensus regarding the result, the justices split as to the rationale. Justice David Davis wrote for the Court: “The
Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.” In other words, neither the executive nor the legislative branch
could authorize trial by military tribunal when the civilian courts were open. Justice Salmon Chase, in a concurrence,
disputed this last point, averring that Congress could institute trial by military tribunal regardless of the status of the
civilian courts.
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that authority to try these defendants.”85 Such frank acknowledgement of realpolitik proved to be a
recurring feature of Biddle’s advocacy.
Royall had intimated several times that he might test the constitutionality of the tribunal
in civil court, and on July 21, he made good on his threat.86 As counsel for the accused, Royall felt
compelled to pursue all available avenues of relief for his clients.87 He also wished to avoid incurring
the wrath of the Roosevelt administration, however, and attempted to meet with the president
to clear his proposed course of action.88 Roosevelt refused to discuss the issue, but told an aide to
instruct Royall to do what the lawyer thought proper.89 Hearing nothing more from the president,
and with the trial on its twelfth day, Royall decided to act.90 That afternoon, he informed the
tribunal that he had made preparations to secure a writ of habeas corpus to test the constitutionality
and validity of the executive’s proclamation and order.91 Knowing that an issue of this magnitude
would need to be resolved by the Supreme Court, Royall contacted the justices—who were recessed
for summer—and asked them to convene in a special session.92 They agreed to do so, and scheduled
oral arguments for July 29.93
With the special session confirmed, Royall then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
for the seven men he represented before a district court.94 This would provide a predicate needed by
the higher court in order for it to adjudicate the case.95 On the night of July 28, the federal district
judge issued a brief ruling denying the request, holding that the defendants, as subjects of a nation at
war with the United States, were “not privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding in
the courts of the United States.”96 Despite Royall’s urging, Milligan was held to be not “controlling
in the circumstances of this petitioner.”97 The next day, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments
regarding the denial of the writ and the constitutionality of the tribunal.98
Mahler, supra note 84.
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III. The Supreme Court Intervenes
A. Battle of the Briefs
The Supreme Court received briefs on July 29, the same day as oral argument. As the
compressed schedule left the justices with little time to prepare, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone
waived the then-existing rule limiting each side to one hour of oral argument.99 Instead, both parties
were given as much time as needed to discuss the issues.100 The decision to hold the special session
was not popular, with much of the public complaining that the process had already been delayed
enough.101 The New York Times reported “all sides hope” that the Court “would make short work of
the move.”102 The Los Angeles Times objected to the irregular summoning of the justices, calling it
“totally un-called-for” to convene the special session.103 The Court “should never have been dragged
into this wartime military matter.”104 Despite these rumblings of discontent, the proceedings went
forward.
The defense submitted a 72-page brief attacking the military tribunal being utilized to try
the saboteurs.105 In a wide-ranging and occasionally repetitive writing, Royall and Dowell made three
main arguments. First, they argued that the “law of war” was analogous to the common law, and no
principle “is better settled than the principle that there is no common law crime against the United
States government.”106 Crimes must be specified by an act of Congress, and the executive was thus
usurping the role of the legislature and infringing upon separation of powers.107 In other words, the
president lacked any inherent authority that would support the proclamation. Second, Royall and
Dowell questioned the constitutionality of the presidential order in light of the Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause.108 The clause expressly prohibits punishment for an act that was not outlawed
at the time of its commission, and a corollary of this provision is that Congress cannot increase
the penalty for a crime committed in the past.109 Because Roosevelt’s proclamation was issued
The Supreme Court’s time allowances for oral argument have changed. See Sup. Ct. R. 28 (“Unless the Court directs
otherwise, each side is allowed one-half hour for argument. Counsel is not required to use all the allotted time.”).
100
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after the saboteurs’ acts had been committed, it was, “therefore, ex post facto as to them.”110 If the
Constitution proscribed Congress from applying ex post facto penalties, they reasoned, how could
it permit the executive to do so? Third, the brief argued that the prohibition on judicial review was
unconstitutional.111 Roosevelt’s order had allowed for judicial review only if jointly authorized by the
attorney general and the secretary of war.112 This “unusual feature” of the proclamation essentially
permitted executive officers to waive a constitutional right, Royall and Dowell protested.113
The prosecution, in a mammoth 93-page brief of its own, offered a strikingly different
perspective.114 Biddle and Cramer denied at the outset that the saboteurs had any right to access an
American court of law. “The great bulwarks of our civil liberties—and the writ of habeas corpus
is one of the most important—was never intended to apply in favor of armed invaders sent here
by the enemy in time of war.”115 Next, the prosecutors carefully distinguished Milligan from the
current situation, finding that by “no stretch of interpretation” could the Civil War-era ruling
apply to the seven defendants.116 In the 1860s, defendant Milligan was not an armed subject of a
belligerent nation, and he did not enter into a theater of operations.117 In the present case, however,
the defendants arrived on American soil wearing the uniforms of a hostile power, and “as agents of
the German Government crossed our lines secretly in enemy warships for the purpose of committing
hostile acts.”118
Interestingly, the prosecutors offered an argument later used by advocates of tribunals for
suspected terrorists: The nature of war had changed, and the law must adapt to the necessities of the
modern battlefield. Whereas invasions at time of Milligan “gave their slow fore-warning months in
advance,” war had become swifter and civilian and military lines were blurred.119 “Wars today are
fought on the total front on the battlefields of joined armies, on the battlefields of production, and
on the battlefields of transportation and morale, by bombing, the sinking of ships, sabotage, spying,
and propaganda.”120 In order to comply with his constitutional oath, the president has “the clear
duty to meet force with force and to exercise his military authority to provide a speedy, certain and
adequate answer, long prescribed by the law of war, to this attack on the safety of the United States
by invading belligerent enemies.”121 The prosecution also defended the departure from the Articles of
Brief in Support of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 38, quoted in Kurland & Casper, supra note 106, at 343.
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112
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War, arguing that belligerents were not entitled to the same rights as members of the United States
military.122 Some of these privileges “should not be granted to belligerent enemies who, in time of
war, enter this country in order to destroy it by acts of war.”123
Biddle and Cramer reached back into medieval legal history in order to support their claim
that habeas requirements were inapplicable in this case. Quoting from Halsbury’s Laws of England,
they argued that the writ of habeas corpus was designed to secure “the liberty of the subject,” and
that it functioned as a mechanism by which the king could question the causes proffered for the
detention of any of his subjects.124 Considering its provenance, then, it was almost obvious that the
writ would not apply to citizens of a country “with which we are at war, or who are subject to its
orders.”125 While conceding that this once categorical legal standard had been relaxed somewhat in
modern times, there was nonetheless no compulsion to apply the writ to a non-subject enemy who
unlawfully entered the United States with hostile intent.126 Lastly, the prosecution argued that the
president had plenary authority over the means of trying the invaders. “The President’s power over
enemies who enter this country in time of war, as armed invaders intending to commit hostile acts,
must be absolute,” they argued.127
B. Oral Argument Regarding the Tribunals and Milligan
The Supreme Court commenced argument at noon on July 29.128 On the first day, only seven
of the justices were present, as Justice Frank Murphy recused himself on the grounds that his status
as a reserve officer disqualified him from sitting in the case.129 Traveling to the nation’s capital from
his home in Oregon, Justice William Douglas missed the first day’s arguments, but was present by
the second day.130 Like the briefs, oral argument was complex and scattershot—understandably, given
the compressed schedule and the loosened time constraints—but the key issues of the propriety of
the tribunal and the import of Milligan were highlighted.
The first major issue addressed was the most fundamental: Was the tribunal, as constructed
by Roosevelt, constitutional? Chief Justice Stone asked Royall if “the President, either with or
without the authority of Congress, may declare martial law and enforce martial law?”131 Royall
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conceded the president’s authority on that point, and stated that where martial law was “properly
and constitutionally declared” military courts would rightly adjudicate cases.132 Stone thought that
Roosevelt’s proclamation might have declared martial law because it referred to the sabotage mission
as “an invasion or predatory incursion.”133 Royall disagreed, stating that martial law “ordinarily is a
territorial matter” and not “dependent upon the character or conduct of the individual.”134 Pressed,
Royall admitted that the United States military could have shot the saboteurs as they landed,
“because they were apparently invading our country,” but finessed this point by arguing that once
they were apprehended, they were entitled to civil due process protections.135 Justice Robert Jackson
seized upon that comment and threw counsel a lifeline, observing, “That is like the case of a criminal
whom you might shoot at in order to stop the commission of a crime; but when he has committed
it, he has a right to trial.”136 Royall found the analogy apropos and pivoted to state the central
propositions of the defense:
First, the petitioners, including the aliens, are entitled to maintain
this present proceeding. Second, the President’s Proclamation,
which assumes to deny the right of the petitioners to maintain this
proceeding, is unconstitutional and invalid. Third, the President’s
Order, which assumes to appoint the alleged Military Commission, is
unconstitutional and invalid. Fourth, the President’s Order, relating to
the alleged Military Commission, is contrary to statute and, therefore,
illegal and invalid. Fifth, the petitioners are entitled to be tried by the
civil courts for any offenses which they may have committed.137
Justice James Byrnes posed a hypothetical: If instead of the eight saboteurs, Hitler and seven of his
generals landed on the banks of the Potomac on a sabotage mission, would they be “entitled to every
right you have discussed in the application for a writ of habeas corpus” and would it be necessary
to convene a grand jury to indict them?138 Royall answered in the affirmative.139 Justice Stanley
Reed then asked if that meant that the civil courts must try every captured spy.140 Royall demurred,
recalling “there is a specific statute which deals with spies,” adding that he thought the statute
valid.141 Justice Felix Frankfurter clarified matters by noting: “What you are saying is that that which
Congress can take out of the constitutional provisions by statute, the President as Commander-in-
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Chief cannot take out of civil statute by military proclamation?”142 Royall, perhaps grateful for this
articulation, signaled his agreement.143
The second significant issue raised in oral arguments was the applicability of the Milligan
precedent. Royall, unsurprisingly, claimed that both opinions in that case “fully sustain our view.”144
While accepting that the holding could be limited to American citizens, he nonetheless maintained
that his clients were entitled to trial before a criminal court.145 Biddle later replied that alien enemies
had no such privilege “under these circumstances, both because of the President’s proclamation
and because of the statutes governing the case,” but also because of “the very ancient and accepted
common law rule that such enemies have no rights in the courts of the sovereign with which they
are enemies.”146 Biddle further argued that nothing in Milligan affected the saboteurs except “a
certain dictum . . . which seemed to me profoundly wrong.”147 He contextualized the case, recalling
that President Abraham Lincoln had violated an 1863 congressional statute that required him to
notify courts of persons detained without the writ of habeas corpus, and suggested that the decision
really turned on that more limited ground.148 Thus, the issue in Milligan was the failure to follow a
statutory command.149 The case assuredly did not mandate a general right to a jury trial when civil
courts were in operation, Biddle argued.150
C. The Court’s Opinion and the Tribunal Precedent
Given the presidential push for expediency, the Court was forced to quickly dispose of the
case. At noon on July 31, the Court released its per curiam decision in a special session lasting only
four minutes, noting it was acting “in advance of the preparation of a full opinion which necessarily
will require a considerable period of time for its preparation and which, when prepared, will be filed
with the Clerk.” 151 In its brief per curiam, the Court upheld the legality of the military commission,
determined that the defendants were lawfully held, and denied the petition to release the men by
writ of habeas corpus.152 Whatever the legal reasoning of the eventual full opinion, the per curiam
decision meant that the fate of the saboteurs was all but sealed.153
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On August 3, the tribunal—legitimated by the Supreme Court’s ruling—found all eight men
guilty and sentenced them to death. After reviewing the trial record, Roosevelt spared two saboteurs
from electrocution: Dasch, whose confession unraveled the whole plot, was sentenced to thirty
years, and a second member of his group was sentenced to life.154 Roosevelt hoped that this show
of clemency would encourage any subsequent saboteurs to surrender in exchange for leniency.155
Fourteen other people had been arrested for providing assistance to the saboteurs, and they would
ultimately be tried in civil court.156 On the morning of August 8, the six saboteurs were executed.157
Despite that finality—or more likely, because of it—the Supreme Court found writing
the full opinion to be a daunting task.158 Recalling the period years later in his memoirs, Douglas
said it was “unfortunate the court took the case.”159 Although it was “easy to agree on the original
per curiam, we almost fell apart when it came time to write out the views.”160 Hoping to break the
standoff, Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a remarkable memo entitled “F.F.’s soliloquy” attacking the
saboteurs as “damned scoundrels” and encouraging his brethren to stay united.161 The memo featured
an imaginary—and somewhat bizarre—scene in which an exasperated Frankfurter addressed the
saboteur defendants with equal parts legalese and invective: “You’ve done enough mischief already
without leaving the seeds of a bitter conflict involving the President, the courts and Congress,” the
Roosevelt confidant wrote.162 “[T]he ground on which you stand—namely the proper construction
of these Articles of War—exists only in your foolish fancy.”163 Soon, Frankfurter seethed, “your
bodies will be rotting in lime.”164
Perhaps in part due to Frankfurter’s impassioned prodding, the Court managed to cobble
together a modicum of consensus by October 29.165 The opinion made clear at the outset that it was
not addressing “any question of guilt or innocence” of the petitioners—a fortunate avoidance, given
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that six of the petitioners had already been electrocuted.166 The opinion started with constitutional
basics, noting that all three branches of government only possess that power bestowed upon them
by the Constitution.”167 In issuing his military order, Roosevelt was properly exercising authority
“conferred upon him by Congress” as well as that granted by the Constitution.168 The Court declined
to consider whether the president, relying on his own constitutional interpretation, could contravene
congressional statutes. “It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to what extent the
President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military commissions without
the support of Congressional legislation.”169 Thus, the justices declined to adopt the most expansive
position advocated by Biddle. Then, in the crux of the opinion—and the portion relied upon by
Bush administration lawyers sixty years later—the Court drew a distinction between lawful and
unlawful combatants. Due to its importance, the potion will be extracted at length:
[T]he law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the
peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who
are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to
capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces.
Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in
addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for
acts which render their belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and
without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of
war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the
enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly
through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life
or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally
deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be
offenders against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by
military tribunals.170
In holding that Milligan was not controlling, the Court carefully distinguished that decision
from the present case.171 Defendant Milligan, as an American citizen of longstanding residence in
Indiana, was neither a lawful belligerent nor an unlawful one—he was simply not a belligerent, and
therefore “not subject to the law of war.”172 Finally, the Court declined to clarify with “meticulous
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care” the ultimate reach of the tribunals.173 Regardless of the precise parameters, it was clear that the
saboteurs were “plainly within these boundaries.”174
D. Popular Reaction to the Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court’s judgment was greeted with near universal acclaim in the United
States. Indeed, when the capture of the saboteurs was first publicized, most of the popular press
and wider public called for rapid punishment. “Demands immediately arose among members of
Congress for swift justice to the saboteurs—for the death penalty if the law permits it,” reported
the Washington Post.176 Opinion polls revealed that Americans favored execution by a ten-to-one
margin.177 “Nothing less than the death penalty will satisfy patriotic Americans,” declared LIFE
magazine, which featured a photo of a group of armed Pennsylvanians volunteering to serve as a
firing squad.178 Roosevelt’s subsequent order mandating trial by military tribunal was “met with
general satisfaction in Washington,” and “calmed the fears of many who realized the delays and
technicalities incident to civil trials,” reported the New York Times.179 Support for the process
persisted through the course of the legal proceedings. Speaking of the initial per curiam opinion
issued by the Court, a satisfied New York Times editorialized that “the country drew a long breath of
relief yesterday at the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision.”180 Approving of the secretive measures
taken to preserve the confidentiality of the tribunal’s work, The Nation sympathetically noted that a
public trial would be “obviously rich in information that can be of value to the enemy, particularly to
other saboteurs still on the loose.”181
Public opinion only shifted when the Supreme Court became involved (as was briefly noted
in a previous section), and Americans became concerned that a final resolution would be delayed.
When the justices announced that they would convene in special session to rule on the legality of
the commission, the defense counsel’s appeal to the civil courts “did not meet popular approval in
Washington,” reported the New York Times.182 “On the contrary, there is great dissatisfaction here
with the length to which the [military trial] had already proceeded.”183 More colorfully, the Detroit
Free Press pronounced, “Realism calls for a stone wall and a firing squad, and not a lot of holierthan-thou eyewash about extending the protection of civil rights to a group that came among us to
175
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blast, burn, and kill.”184 This mainstream endorsement of rapid retribution is striking to the modern
reader. Jack Goldsmith, the former head of Bush’s Office of Legal Counsel, cites this popular faith in
the government—and support for harsh measures against the Nazi saboteurs—as evidence of a “lost
legal culture.”185
Given this background, then, it is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court’s decision
received a warm reception. Indeed, it is difficult to know what other conclusion the Court could
have reached given the societal consensus. “Americans can have the satisfaction of knowing that even
in a time of great national peril we did not stoop to the practices of our enemies,” applauded the
Washington Post.186 The New York Times was similarly patriotic and self-congratulatory in defending
the Supreme Court’s interlude. “We had to try them because a fair trial for any person accused of
crime, however apparent his guilt, is one of things we defend in this war,” wrote the paper.187 The
New Republic was even more effusive. “It is good to know that even in wartime and even toward
the enemy we do not abandon our basic protection of individual rights,” gushed the magazine.188
The Quirin decision told the world that Americans “have invoked the rule of law even in the case of
enemy saboteurs.”189
Though largely drowned out by this groundswell of support, there was a susurrus of dissent.
There was no need for summary execution, and there was “similarly no need to make a farce out
of justice, when everyone knew at the very start of the trial what the outcome would be,” wrote
Norman Cousins in the Saturday Review of Literature.190 “If the saboteurs actually had a chance,
it would be different, but they didn’t; we knew it, and they knew it.”191 The legal scholar Edward
Corwin voiced similar misgivings in a book published five years later, in which he described the
Court’s Quirin opinion as “little more than a ceremonious detour to a predetermined end.”192 A
former law clerk to Justice Hugo Black was even more scathing, later writing that the Court had
simply “allowed itself to be stampeded,” and “if the judges are to run a court of law and not a
butcher shop, the reasons for killing a man should be expressed before he is dead.”193 These views
were hardly representative, however, and the harshest criticisms emerged long after the decision
was rendered. At the time, the vast majority of Americans considered the Court’s decision not just
correct, but ennobling.
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IV. Quirin Reconsidered in the Age of Terror
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the Quirin decision seemed destined to remain
in relative oblivion, a legal relic that was the consummate product of its time. After the attacks of
September 11, 2001, however, the United States was a country shaken and transformed.194 White
House officials grasped desperately for precedents in what was, in some ways, an unprecedented
situation. This section begins by examining President George W. Bush’s military order authorizing
military tribunals, its subsequent revisions, and its similarities to the order issued by Roosevelt.
Second, the Hamdi case is examined, and portions of the opinion addressing and construing Quirin
are analyzed.195 Third, the landmark Hamdan decision is similarly parsed, with the saboteur case
again receiving attention.196 Fourth, the controversial Boumediene decision is evaluated.197 Although
the last case does not feature a particularly novel debate on the contemporary meaning of Quirin,
it is the most recent significant decision on the Guantanamo issue and starkly demonstrates how
fraught the tribunal issue has become.
A. President Bush’s Military Order
Within months of the attacks, the Bush administration had decided to try those who aided
and abetted the 9/11 strike by military commission. The Bush order issued on November 13, 2001,
closely resembled the one promulgated by Roosevelt in 1942.198 Like its predecessor, the Bush
proclamation required only two-thirds of the commission to agree in order to secure conviction.199
Similarly, evidence could be admitted that would have “probative value to a reasonable person,” a
standard borrowed from Roosevelt’s order.200 Both presidents nonetheless instructed the tribunal to
conduct a “full and fair trial,” and each prohibited judicial review (although Bush did not allow the
attorney general and secretary of war to jointly override this restriction, as Roosevelt did).201
The government’s reliance on the Quirin precedent extended beyond the order itself. Besides
the quoted legal language above, Vice President Dick Cheney emphasized the connection of the
two events when he approvingly recalled that the German saboteurs had been “executed in relatively
rapid order.”202 The Bush administration was not the first to invoke the example of the saboteurs
when confronted by terrorism. In the George H.W. Bush administration, Attorney General William
Thomas H. Kean, et. al., The 9/11 Commission Report, Executive Summary, http://www.9-11commission.gov/
report/911Report_Exec.htm (“At 8:46 on the morning of September 11, 2001, the United States became a nation
transformed.”).
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Barr proposed trying the terrorists responsible for exploding a Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland
by military tribunal, noting that the case of the Nazi saboteurs furnished the “most apt precedent.”203
The Bush administration favored tribunals after September 11 for many of the same reasons
that Roosevelt had in the wake of Pearl Harbor: There was a sense that unlawful combatants were
not deserving of the same constitutional rights and privileges as citizens. “Foreign terrorists who
commit war crimes against the United States, in my judgment, are not entitled to and do not deserve
the protection of the American Constitution,” argued Attorney General John Ashcroft (echoing
Biddle’s language), “particularly when there could be very serious and important reasons related to
not bringing them back to the United States for justice.”204 A secondary concern was a fear that a
trial of a high profile terrorist would devolve into a farcical, media-driven spectacle. Stewart Baker, a
former general counsel to the National Security Agency, said at the time, “I don’t think anyone wants
to see Osama bin Laden brought before a court here to be defended by Johnnie Cochran.”205
Although it was the initial administration statement on the tribunals, Bush’s military
order was subsequently revised. On March 21, 2002, the Department of Defense issued Military
Commission Order No. 1.206 In a news conference held the day of its unveiling, Pentagon General
Counsel William Haynes II expressly cited the Quirin decision for legal backing.207 In 1942, he
noted, the Supreme Court had “found that the president’s order in that case was constitutional and
properly applied.”208 The Pentagon’s order retained many of the core features of Bush’s November
proclamation, although there were some adaptations. Most notable was the decision to require a
unanimous vote of seven commissioned military members on the tribunal in order to administer the
death penalty.209 This was a departure from the policy of Roosevelt (and Bush, originally), requiring
only a two-thirds majority.210
B. Hamdi Reaches the Supreme Court
Unlike the rapidity with which the Nazi saboteur case reached the Supreme Court, the Bush
administration’s war policies were not evaluated by the nation’s highest judicial body until 2004.211
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld stemmed from a petition by Yaser Esam Hamdi, a Louisiana native captured
in a prison rebellion in Afghanistan, subsequently imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, and ultimately
transferred to a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina. On June 28, 2004, eight justices rejected
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the government’s assertion that the executive branch had the unimpeachable right to hold Hamdi
free from judicial review. Although only Justice Clarence Thomas departed from this holding, the
other eight justices could not agree on the reasoning. Writing for a plurality, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor noted:
We necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of
powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts
in such circumstances. . . . We have long since made clear that a state
of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the
rights of the Nation’s citizens. . . . Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other
nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflicts, it most
assuredly envisions a role of all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake.212
The plurality further held that an enemy combatant “must receive notice of the factual basis for the
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decision-maker.”213
The Court’s various writings all acknowledged the Quirin decision. The plurality described
it thusly: “It both postdates and clarifies Milligan, providing us with the most apposite precedent
that we have on the question of whether citizens may be detained in such circumstances.”214 Justice
O’Connor noted that one of the saboteurs, Herbert Haupt, had contended that he was an American
citizen and thus could not be classified as an “enemy combatant.”215 The Quirin court disagreed,
holding that “citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and
with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents
within the meaning of . . . the law of war.”216 O’Connor found nothing in the saboteur decision
indicating that citizenship, if proved, would have spared Haupt from military justice.
Justices Antonin Scalia and John Paul Stevens, in their concurrence and dissent, sardonically
described Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour.”217 They noted that only three paragraphs of the
decision dealt with the particular circumstances of Haupt’s citizenship argument, so the present
Court’s reliance on such dicta was misplaced. Their opinion doubted whether the saboteur decision
properly interpreted Milligan, but even if it did, “Quirin would still not justify denial of the writ
here,” because whereas the saboteurs were “admitted enemy invaders,” petitioner Hamdi “insists that
he is not a belligerent.”218 In light of subsequent writings—most conspicuously, the jarring dissent
in Boumediene—Scalia’s position here may be surprising. The key to understanding his philosophy
212
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on the combatant issue is to recognize the centrality of citizenship in his analysis.219 For Scalia,
citizens cannot be classified as enemy combatants and tried by military tribunals unless Congress has
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.220
C. Hamdan and the Expansion of Detainee Rights
The next major detainee case to be heard by the Supreme Court was Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
in which the military commissions operating at Guantanamo Bay were found to violate both the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.221 The case
centered on Salim Hamdan, a Yemeni chauffer for Osama bin Laden who was captured by Afghani
militia and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.222 In July 2004, he was charged with conspiracy to
commit terrorist acts and was slated for trial under a military commission pursuant to Military
Commission Order No. 1 (the revised order issued on March 21, 2002 and discussed above).223 In
the wake of Hamdi, the government had instituted Combatant Status Review Tribunals tasked with
judging whether individuals were correctly labeled enemy combatants.224 Hamdan challenged his
designation in that forum, and after his designation was upheld, sought relief in the civil courts.
Eventually, his petition reached the Supreme Court.225
The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Stevens, first considered the issue of jurisdiction.
The government asserted that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and prior precedent, Schlesinger
v. Councilman (1975), precluded the Court from considering Hamdan’s petition.226 The Court
distinguished Councilman as applying only to members of the United States military facing courtmartial, and instead, cited Quirin for the proposition that the Court was entitled to consider the
constitutionality of military tribunals. The Court refused to decide whether laws barring all habeas
corpus petitions would be constitutional, noting that the Detainee Treatment Act did not assert this
authority.
The Quirin decision received extensive consideration by Stevens, largely because of its
centrality to the government’s argument. Given the circumstances, Stevens found the invocation
of Quirin “both appropriate and unsurprising. Since Guantanamo Bay is neither enemy-occupied
territory nor under martial law, the law-of-war commission is the only model available.”227 The
Jerome A. Barron, Citizenship Matters: The Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y
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government had also relied on the saboteur case, a fortiori, because “no more robust model of
executive power exists” and the saboteur case “represents the high-water mark of military power
to try enemy combatants for war crimes,” noted Stevens.228 Citing a classic treatise of military
law penned by Colonel William Winthrop (an author widely considered the William Blackstone
of military law), the Court distinguished the saboteur case from that of the Yemeni national.229
“If anything, Quirin supports Hamdan’s argument that conspiracy is not a violation of the law of
war.”230
With the jurisdiction issue dispatched, Stevens applied Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions to the Guantanamo detainees. This provision requires humane treatment of captured
combatants and prohibits trials except by “a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people.”231 Stevens returned to Quirin
near the end of his opinion, positing that military commissions have historically been “tribunals of
necessity” under wartime conditions.232 “Exigency lent the commission its legitimacy,” he wrote, “but
did not further justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections.”233
Once again, Justice Scalia countered this interpretation of the relevant precedents. Scalia’s
opinion found the Detainee Treatment Act plainly controlling, and construed the 2005 law to
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.234 The Court resisted this interpretation, yet “it cannot cite
a single case in the history of Anglo-American law (before today) in which a jurisdiction-stripping
provision was denied immediate effect in pending cases.”235 Scalia objected to Stevens’s finding that
Quirin tilted in favor of petitioner Hamdan, saying that such reliance suffered from a “fundamental
defect,” as it “ignores the [Detainee Treatment Act], which creates an avenue for the consideration
of petitioner’s claims that did not exist at the time of Quirin.”236 In summary, while the saboteurs
had no hope for habeas review in the 1942 military tribunal, Hamdan had the benefit of a
congressionally enacted habeas review framework. Thus, in the instant case, “Quirin is no longer
governing precedent.”237
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D. Boumediene and the Current State of the Law
The most decisive—and divisive—decision came three years later. In December 2007, the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the momentous case of Boumediene v. Bush.238 The case
arose from a habeas petition submitted by Lakhdar Boumediene, a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina
being held at Guantanamo.239 The case, consolidated with Al Odah v. United States, challenged the
legality of the plaintiff ’s detention and the constitutionality of the Military Commission Act of
2006, which had been drafted in the wake of Hamdan.240 The decision proved noteworthy both
because of its expansive holding and the impassioned rhetoric it inspired in the justices.241
A five-to-four opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy held the Military Commission
Act unconstitutional and granted the Guantanamo prisoners the right to habeas corpus.242 Because
the United States exercised “de facto” sovereignty over Guantanamo, Justice Kennedy reasoned,
enemy combatants imprisoned there were entitled to habeas protections outlined in Article I, Section
9 of the Constitution (known as the Suspension Clause).243 Kennedy’s opinion only discussed
Quirin tangentially. He squared his opinion with that precedent by arguing, “habeas corpus review
may be more circumscribed if the underlying detention proceedings are more thorough than
they were here.”244 Finding that the saboteur proceeding was more limited in scope and afforded
more protections to the saboteurs than the Military Commission Act, Kennedy deemed Quirin
inapposite.245
The case featured two forceful dissents, including one from Chief Justice John Roberts.
“Today the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of procedural protections ever
afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants,” he declared.246 Given that the
Court was replacing legislatively crafted review mechanisms with more amorphous, court-enacted
procedures, he accused his brethren of judicial aggrandizement.247 In short, the review process
constructed by Congress provided constitutionally adequate habeas protections.248
Justice Scalia, true to form, was even more vehement in dissent.249 “Today, for the first time
in our Nation’s history, the Court confers a constitutional right to habeas corpus on alien enemies
See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723.
Id. at 734; Steven Erlanger, Ex-Detainee Describes His 7 Years at Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2009.
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detained abroad by our military forces in the course of an ongoing war,” he wrote.250 Contrary to
the Court’s interpretation, the “writ of habeas corpus does not, and never has, run in favor of aliens
abroad; the Suspension Clause thus has no application, and the Court’s intervention in this military
matter is entirely ultra vires.”251 In a self-confessed unusual approach, Scalia began not with the
legal deficiencies he saw in the majority’s reasoning, but the practical consequences of the decision.
Reminding his colleagues that the country was at war with radical Islamists, Scalia bluntly stated
that the decision “will almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”252 The executive branch
deliberately relied on Eisentrager and other precedents in placing detainees in Guantanamo; in the
absence of this case law, the government would likely have held enemy combatants in Afghanistan
in conditions that “might well have been worse for the detainees themselves.”253 Scalia also
emphasized that determining the dangerousness of enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo was
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, and observed that some detainees released by the military
returned to terrorist activity.254
Even more galling for Scalia, the Court was wading into an area far removed from its
traditional expertise. The handling of enemy prisoners should be entrusted to the executive branch,
not the judiciary. “What drives today’s decision is neither the meaning of the Suspension Clause,
nor the principles of our precedents, but rather an inflated notion of judicial supremacy,” wrote
Scalia, expanding on Roberts’s criticism.255 In a blistering conclusion, Scalia argued that the majority
improperly extended the reach of habeas corpus, misconstrued controlling law to break “a chain of
precedent as old as the common law that prohibit judicial inquiry into detentions of aliens abroad
absent statutory authorization,” and impossibly burdened military commanders in the field with
indeterminate evidentiary requirements.256 “The Nation will live to regret what the Court has done
today,” Scalia forebodingly concluded.257
V. Conclusion
As these recent cases indicate, Quirin was not the last word on the military tribunal issue.
Indeed, it was not even the last word on military tribunals related to Nazi sabotage. In a repeat
mission in late 1944, two trained Nazi agents landed by U-boat in Maine and proceeded to New
York to engage in intelligence operations (namely, transmitting information back to Germany
by shortwave radio).258 This second operation was as ineffective as the first, and the FBI quickly
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rounded up the duo.259 In prosecuting the Nazi agents, however, the government slightly modified
its earlier approach. Although Biddle was eager to reprise his role as tribunal prosecutor, Stimson—
privately deriding the attorney general as a publicity-hungry “little man”—urged Roosevelt to adopt
a more hands-off posture.260 Roosevelt agreed, and his military order granted the War Department
wide latitude, allowing commanding generals “to appoint military commissions for the trial of
such persons.”261 The trial, which took place in New York City, resulted in sentences of death by
hanging.262 Unlike in 1942, the trial was not much of a spectacle. The 1944 proceeding did not
feature executive branch leaders as prosecutors, and final reviewing authority was not vested in the
president. Despite these differences, however, one obvious similarity remained: in both cases, the
saboteurs were tried by military tribunal.
The Quirin case has enjoyed an unanticipated rebirth in the post-9/11 world, playing a
significant role in the ongoing debate as to whether suspected terrorists should be tried by military
tribunal. Legal issues emanating from the War on Terror are contentious, as may be expected
considering the stakes. President Barack Obama has repeatedly pledged to shut down the detention
facility at Guantanamo Bay, obliquely referencing the issue in his inaugural address and making
express calls and repeated efforts to close the prison since then.263 Yet seven years later, in the
twilight of Obama’s presidency, enemy combatants remain imprisoned in Guantanamo.264 Although
the Obama administration’s efforts to shutter the prison are often described as falling victim to
Republican opposition, the reality is that support for detaining suspected terrorists at Guantanamo is
bipartisan and enduring.265 Whether one views Guantanamo as a constitutional travesty or wartime
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necessity, it is clear that it is probably here to stay. The same can be said for the larger jurisprudential
issues surrounding it.
This writing has attempted to contextualize this argument by focusing on the Nazi
saboteur case. By recounting the circumstances that led to the decision, one can see both its
commonalities and its differences with issues presented by the War on Terror. Similarly, by closely
analyzing Quirin and showing how it has been interpreted, disputed, and reimagined in the
contemporary Guantanamo cases, the reader can see how the Supreme Court handles—and perhaps
manipulates—a crucial precedent. In some ways, the saboteur case is particularly relevant to the
present situation. Then and now, the United States is at war, detains dangerous individuals intent
on killing Americans, and faces real risks in prosecuting suspected enemies in the traditional court
system. On the other hand, the Quirin decision may be an unstable foundation for War on Terror
jurisprudence. When Justice Scalia observes that the case was not “this Court’s finest hour,” he
is acknowledging the reality, however muted in 1942, that the justices were ratifying a foregone
conclusion.266 There is considerable credence to that view. The public clamor for harsh punishment
of the Nazi saboteurs—vividly reflected in the press accounts of the time—may have rendered any
contrary decision of the Court a political nullity, and Roosevelt’s comments to his attorney general
suggested that there was not even a decision for the Court to make. It is an old cliché that “hard
cases make bad precedents,” but as Quirin shows, easy cases may make troublesome precedents just
as readily.267
While it is impossible to predict how the nation’s highest court and its political leaders will
handle the related issues of enemy combatants and military tribunals in the coming years, these
issues will remain for at least the near future—and perhaps longer. Particularly if there is another
large-scale attack and anti-terror efforts are redoubled, Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene could prove
more prophetic than despairing. Regardless of how this debate unfolds, one thing is all but certain:
The Quirin decision will be featured prominently, and only by understanding the history of the
saboteur case will an observer be able to determine if the precedent is being properly applied.

Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 561.
See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., concurring) (“Great cases like hard
cases make bad law.”).
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Date (1942)

Event

June 12

Saboteurs Land in the United States

June 27

FBI Announces Capture

July 2

President Roosevelt Orders Trial by Military Tribunal

July 8

Military Trial Begins

July 29

Supreme Court Special Session Convenes to Hear Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus

July 31

Supreme Court Issues Per Curiam Denying Writ of Habeas Corpus

August 3

Military Tribunal Issues Verdict

August 7

President Roosevelt Completes Review of Verdict

August 8

Six of the Eight Saboteurs Executed

October 29

Supreme Court Issues Full Quirin Opinion

